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George Lakoff and Mark Johnson intended to radically change one of 
the dominant traditions of Western philosophy, that is, the tradition of 
abstract theory that stretches from the ancient Greeks down through the 
writings of the contemporary analytic philosophers. In place of de-
contextualized and thus culturally uniformed theories about the nature 
of reality, mind, language, and individualism, Lakoff and Johnson 
proposed that the task of the philosopher is to clarify how the 
metaphorical basis of language, and thus systems of knowing, 
originates in the embodied experience of individuals. Their agenda is 
summed up in the title of their major book, Philosophy in the Flesh: 
The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought (1999). 
While they make a cogent case against the many ways in which 
Western philosophers have framed the process of reasoning, thus 
achieving little more for humanity than giving legitimacy to their own 
theoretical edifices, the Lakoff and Johnson argument that metaphorical 
reasoning originates in the individual’s “sensorimotor experiences so 
regularly they become neurally linked”1 represents an equally extreme 
C. A. Bowers has taught at the University of Oregon and Portland State 
University, and now, in retirement, serves as adjunct professor of 
environmental studies at the University of Oregon. Bowers has published 14 
books that address the cultural roots of the ecological crisis. His most recent 
are: Educating for an Ecologically Sustainable Culture (1995); The Culture of 
Denial (1997); Let them Eat Data (2000); Educating for Eco-Justice and 
Community (2001); Detras de la Apariencia (2002) and Conserving in an Era 
of Ecological Uncertainties.  
 
 
Volume 24, Number 3 
 
137 
and problematic position. In place of the rational process represented by 
most Western philosophers as free of both cultural and embodied 
experiences, Lakoff and Johnson argue that the starting point of 
philosophy, science, and knowledge generally begins with the 
individual’s perceptual and motor systems—that is, embodied 
experience. In his most recent book, The Meaning of the Body: 
Aesthetics of Human Understanding (2007), Johnson introduces the 
phrase “organism-environment coupling” to reaffirm the earlier position 
he shares with Lakoff that knowledge of the environment is limited to 
the embodied experience of the individual. As will be explained later, 
this precludes learning about the environment from scientific studies 
and from the observations and insights of others. 
The word culture occasionally appears in their joint writings on how 
language is framed by embodied experience, but its complex nature and 
diversity is not explored in any depth. One of the results is that the 
implications of a comparative study of different cultural epistemes has 
for bringing into the question the Western notion of the autonomous 
(that is, the supposedly culturally uninfluenced) individual they take for 
granted—and upon which their entire theory rests—is not considered. A 
word they do not mention is ecology. This omission leads to their 
failure to acknowledge that, today, the ecological crises should frame 
any discussion of metaphorical thinking. What cannot be explained by 
their theory is why they share this oversight with key Western 
philosophers who also ignored how the environments of their era were 
being degraded. Supposedly, the individual whose sensorimotor 
experiences and habituated neural connections become the basis for 
framing the meaning of words (metaphors), and thus for how 
relationships are understood, is unaffected by the global changes in the 
natural environment.  
This is not simply an oversight with few if any serious implications. It 
becomes of paramount importance when it is recognized that the 
extrapolation of the word ecology, which is the modernized version of 
the early Greek word oikos, always situates the individual as a 
participant within a cultural and environmental context. It is only when 
the “individual” is treated as an abstraction that these ecological 
relationships are ignored. In effect, the individual’s embodied 
participation in this larger ecology of relationships includes other 
people, the semiotic systems of the culturally constructed world, and 
the complex message exchanges (which Gregory Bateson refers to as 
the “difference which makes a difference”2) that sustain the complex 
and interdependent living systems we refer to as the natural 
environment. 
The Trumpeter 138 
In order to understand the long-term problem of locating, as Lakoff and 
Johnson put it, “our conceptual system” in the individual’s “perceptual 
and motor systems,”3 it is necessary to summarize the changes that the 
Earth’s natural systems are undergoing. It needs to be recognized that 
global warming is just one aspect of the ecological crises that is not 
likely to be addressed by concepts derived from the embodied and thus 
limited experience of the individual. Indeed, their extreme reductionist 
understanding of the origins of knowledge leads to a radical difference 
between what individuals would learn from their embodied encounters 
with their local environments and what scientists are now reporting. For 
example, scientists studying the impact of global warming have 
documented that the Greenland ice cap is melting at an accelerating 
rate, with one glacier moving to the sea at a rate of two metres an hour 
on a three-mile front and at a depth of 1500 metres. The melting of the 
Arctic sea ice and the glaciers in the Antarctic is also accelerating at a 
rate totally beyond what scientists thought possible. And the glaciers in 
the Himalayas and the Tibet-Qinghai Plateau, which feed the major 
rivers in India and China, are disappearing at a rate of seven per cent a 
year, with glaciers in other parts of the world disappearing at similar 
rates.4 The basic assumptions (listed below) of Lakoff and Johnson 
limit the individual’s conceptual understanding of the environment to 
the inherently limited nature of embodied experience. The result would 
be that grasping the world-wide consequences of global warming would 
be beyond the individual’s conceptualization.  
There are other changes in the life-sustaining capacity of the Earth’s 
ecosystems that would also go unrecognized. In addition to the global 
threat to the sources of fresh water that hundreds of millions of people 
face, there are similar changes in the chemistry of the world’s oceans. 
As the oceans absorb higher levels of carbon dioxide they are becoming 
more acidic, and this change in chemistry, as well as in temperature, is 
threatening the organisms that are the basis of the ocean food chain. 
Other changes in the world’s oceans include the near extinction of 
many fisheries that are the vital sources of protein for much of the 
world’s population.5
The huge growth of the world’s human population over the last century, 
along with the spread of economic globalization, have combined into an 
increasingly destructive force that is undermining the capacity of 
natural systems to regenerate themselves. Until social philosophers and 
market liberals turned Adam Smith’s theory of free markets and the 
“invisible hand” into an abstract and thus universal law of economics, 
 In addition, droughts are affecting many regions of 
the world, and vast forests are dying off due to changes in temperatures 
that make them vulnerable to insects. And the estimated loss of the 
earth’s topsoil has been estimated at over thirty per cent.  
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markets were local and integrated into the cultural fabric (including 
moral norms governing reciprocity) of the world’s diverse 
communities. This abstract theory has now taken on the same status as 
the law of gravity, and has become a major force in spreading the 
industrial-consumer dependent lifestyle that is increasing the rate of 
environmental degradation. China, for example, is transforming into a 
consumer-oriented society, and now is first in the production of coal, 
steel, and cement. It also has 16 of the world’s 20 most-polluted cities. 
China’s current economic downturn is being met by reducing the 
production of consumer goods for export, which is being replaced by 
greater investment in infrastructure projects—including the building of 
more coal-fired electrical generating (and carbon emitting) plants. 
These plants are being built at a rate of one very week or so. China has 
already consumed the forests of Thailand, Cambodia, and the 
Philippines—and at the current rate will swallow the forests of five 
neighbouring countries, including the forests of the Russian Far East 
within two decades. India, Brazil, as well as many other countries are 
also on the same consumer-oriented cultural pathway of development. 
Indeed, consumerism and the adoption of Western patterns of thinking 
and values are now associated with becoming modern and developed, 
and thus free of being stigmatized as culturally backward.  
Since philosophers have a long history of ignoring how cultural belief 
systems impact the life-sustaining capacity of local ecosystems, the 
question that is likely to come up is: what relevance does this overview 
of the ecological crises have for assessing what is problematic about the 
Lakoff-Johnson theory of the embodied origins of our guiding 
metaphors? What is being overlooked by the scientists and engineers 
who are trying to develop more sustainable and less carbon producing 
technologies, and by the general public that has accepted that new 
technologies are the solution to the ecological crises, is that we need to 
change the metaphorical language that gave conceptual direction and 
moral legitimacy to the industrial-consumer oriented culture that has 
become a major contributor to overshooting the sustaining capacity of 
natural systems. Lakoff and Johnson got it right when they argued in 
Metaphors We Live By (1980) that all thought is based on metaphors, 
When they made the turn toward locating the source of metaphors in 
the embodied experience of the individual, which was motivated by 
their concern with the hegemony of abstract theory and language usage 
by mainstream Western philosophers, they lost sight of the more 
obvious and now ecologically important characteristic of language. 
That is, they ignored that words as metaphors have a history and that 
they carry forward the misconceptions and silences of earlier thinkers 
who succeeded in establishing the analogs that framed the meaning of 
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words over time. In effect, they failed to recognize that the industrial-
consumer oriented culture that is now being globalized, and that is 
overshooting the sustaining capacity of the natural systems, is based on 
the metaphorical thinking of earlier thinkers who were unaware of 
environmental limits.  
Before explaining how much of today’s ecologically problematic 
thinking is based on what Gregory Bateson refers to as “double bind 
thinking,” it is necessary to reproduce here the six basic assumptions on 
which the Lakoff and Johnson theory is based. In order to avoid any 
misrepresentation of their assumptions, the assumptions shall be 
presented as they appear in Philosophy in the Flesh. 
Embodied Reason 
• Embodied Concepts: Our conceptual system is grounded in, 
neurally makes use of, and is critically shaped by our perceptual 
and motor systems. 
• Conceptualization Only Through the Body: We can only form 
concepts through the body. Therefore, every understanding that 
we can have of the world, ourselves, and others can only be 
formed in terms of concepts shaped by our bodies. 
• Basic-Level Concepts: These concepts use our perceptual, 
imaging, and motor systems to characterize our optimal 
functioning in everyday life. This is the level at which we are 
maximally in touch with the reality of our environment. 
• Embodied Reason: Major forms of rational inference are 
instances of sensorimotor inferences. 
• Embodied Truth and Knowledge: Because our ideas are framed 
in terms of our unconscious embodied conceptual systems, truth 
and knowledge depend upon embodied understanding. 
• Embodied Mind: Because concepts and reason both derive from, 
and make use of, the sensorimotor system, the mind is not 
separate from or independent of the body. Therefore, classical 
faculty psychology is incorrect.6
There can be no doubt that many of our metaphors have their origins in 
bodily experiences, as Lakoff and Johnson point out. Concepts such as 
up and down, back and forward, full and empty, and even the old 
British systems of measurement of inch, foot, yard, and mile can be 
traced back to bodily experiences. Also, their discussion of how 
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different experiences provide generative frameworks (schemas) for 
understanding activities, behaviours, and policies, where the already 
familiar becomes the model for understanding something new, has to be 
taken seriously. It needs to be pointed out, however, that their insight is 
only partially correct. Some of our concepts do have an embodied 
origin yet even these conceptual schemas will differ from culture to 
culture, depending on the culture’s mythopoetic narratives or 
cosmology, or both. For example, while Lakoff and Johnson would 
attribute the concept that underlies the use of the personal pronoun “I” 
to the embodied experience of an individual, they overlook that this is a 
culturally constructed identity—one that can be traced back to the 
writings of post-medieval philosophers and political theorists. Instead 
of the “I want” and “I think” habituated pattern of thinking so prevalent 
in the West, there are profoundly different ways of understanding self 
which vary from culture to culture. Among the traditional Maori, for 
example, when a guest enters into the marea (the communal gathering 
place) she gives her name and then her lineage—followed by an 
explanation of her ties to the family or group she is visiting. If we 
consider the Quechua of the Peruvian Andes we find a different way in 
which this relational self is understood—which can be traced to their 
cosmovision that represents all aspects of life as interdependent and in 
constant communication—with plants, animals, and weather patterns 
communicating what the people’s agricultural decisions should be. The 
key point is that Lakoff and Johnson repeat the silences about the 
influence of culture that characterizes Western philosophy. One of the 
consequences of perpetuating this hubris is that readers who take them 
seriously are not likely to recognize that we have much to learn from 
cultures that have developed in ways that enabled them to live within 
the limits and possibilities of their bioregions.  
While Lakoff and Johnson also remain silent about the ecological 
crises, the consensus of the world’s scientists is that we are within a few 
generations of a tipping point when changes in human behaviours will 
no longer be able to slow the rate of global warming. It is important, 
therefore, to consider whether the Lakoff and Johnson theory of the 
embodied basis of metaphorical thinking is useful for understanding 
why the dominant Western culture continues to promote an industrial-
consumer dependent lifestyle when the evidence continues to mount 
that it is ecologically unsustainable. The other question that needs to be 
raised is whether their theory of the embodied origins of our concepts 
can lead to fundamental changes in ways of thinking and behaviours 
that have a smaller ecological footprint—including changes in our 
policies of economic and cultural colonization that prevent other 
cultures from revitalizing their traditions of self-sufficiency and mutual 
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support, traditions that are less dependent upon a money economy and 
that have a smaller ecological footprint. 
The Lakoff and Johnson theory of metaphor fails to take into account 
that words have a culturally specific history. As metaphors whose 
meanings were framed by analogs established in the distant past by 
people who were unaware of environmental limits and other cultural 
knowledge and moral systems, these words continue to influence 
current thinking in ways that reproduce the misconceptions and silences 
taken for granted in earlier times. Albert Einstein was aware of this 
problem when he warned about the danger of relying on the same 
mindset that created the problem to fix it. “Double bind thinking” is the 
phrase Gregory Bateson used to describe this same problem, which he 
understood as the failure to recognize that the meaning of key words 
used today as the basis for understanding current problems and 
relationships were framed by the analogs established by earlier thinkers 
who were addressing issues in a different historical and cultural era.  
The analogs that framed the meaning of words such as intelligence, 
technology, tradition, individualism, property, freedom, woman, 
environment, and so forth, can be traced back to earlier theories, 
powerful evocative experiences, and even to mythopoetic narratives 
such as those found in the Book of Genesis. For example, the limiting 
analogs that framed how the word woman was understood in the West 
over thousands of years did not arise out of the 
embodied/sensorimotor/neurally connected experience of today’s 
individual. Nor do today’s widely accepted understanding, especially 
within the academic community, of such words and phrases as 
tradition, artificial intelligence, property, and enlightenment have their 
origins in the subjective embodied experience of the individual. The 
analogs that continue to frame what is understood today as the meaning 
of these words can be traced back to earlier events and thinkers. To 
summarize a key shortcoming of the Lakoff and Johnson theory about 
the origins of metaphorical thinking: it cannot account for the linguistic 
colonization of the present by the past.  
Nor can their theory clarify the dynamics of the linguistic colonization 
of other cultures. Indeed, if one gives careful consideration to their six 
key assumptions, it becomes impossible to explain the differences in 
cultural ways of knowing—including why some cultures have 
developed in ways that are more ecologically sustainable. For example, 
the collection of essays by Third World writers in Wolfgang Sachs’ The 
Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power (1992) 
provide examples of how such words as development, market, and 
poverty—whose meanings were framed by the analogs taken for 
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granted by Western thinkers—are understood as the language of 
cultural colonization. Gérald Berthoud summarizes the colonizing 
agenda in the Western use of development: 
What must be universalized through development is a cultural complex 
centred around the notion that human life, if it is to be fully lived, cannot 
be constrained by limits of any kind.  
To produce such a result in traditional societies, for whom the supposedly 
primordial principle of boundless expansion in the technological and 
economic domains is generally alien, presuppose overcoming the 
symbolic and moral ‘obstacles’, that is, ridding these societies of various 
inhibiting ideas and practices such as myths, ceremonies, rituals, mutual 
aid, networks of solidarity, and the like.7 
Berthoud identifies the analogs that frame the Western idea of 
development by observing that it subjects Third World cultures to “the 
compelling idea that everything that can be made must be made, and 
then sold. Our universe (according the Western way of thinking) 
appears unshakeably structured by the omnipotence of technoscientific 
truths and the laws of the market.”8 The other essays in The 
Development Dictionary explain how key words in the modern 
vocabulary are not culturally neutral metaphors, but are part of the 
process of linguistic colonization that serves to legitimate economic 
colonization. And the combination of linguistic and economic 
colonization impacts the behaviour of individuals—even at the level of 
the individual’s “perceptual, imaging, and motor systems”—which is 
the reverse of the Lakoff and Johnson formula that represents bodily 
experiences as shaping the individual’s conceptual system.  
There is another characteristic of metaphorical thinking ignored by 
Lakoff and Johnson that is critical to whether we are able to adopt a 
more ecologically informed way of thinking and behaving. The image 
(or iconic) metaphors they focus on as originating in embodied 
experiences, as well as image metaphors that come down to us from 
earlier times (which they do not recognize) are often framed by the 
prevailing root metaphors of the culture. According to Richard H. 
Brown, root metaphors are meta-cognitive schemata that are taken for 
granted and thus frame thinking in a wide area of cultural activity over 
years—even centuries9
In the West, patriarchy and anthropocentrism are examples of taken-
for-granted explanatory and moral frameworks (root metaphors) that 
have not only framed how people think and behave, but also what they 
. They originate in the mythopoetic narratives of 
the culture, powerful evocative experiences that are sustained over 
generations, and from the processes of analogic-based theories by 
writers who were able to overturn older root metaphors.  
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ignore. Individualism and progress also are examples of root metaphors, 
and they can be traced back to various political theorists, evocative 
experiences ranging from the introduction of the printing press to the 
early successes of modern science. Mechanism is yet another root 
metaphor whose origin was not in the individual’s bodily experiences, 
but originated from a combination of historical events—ranging from 
organizing the rhythms of daily life in accordance with the cycles of a 
mechanical clock, the successful applications of a mechanistic 
paradigm by scientists, to advances in medicine and other technologies 
such as computers. The explanatory power of the mechanism root 
metaphor used over hundreds of years can be seen in Johannes Kepler’s 
(1571–1630) statement that “my aim is to show that the celestial 
machine is to be likened not to a divine organism but to a clockwork”; 
in Marvin Minsky’s (early leader in the field of artificial intelligence) 
statement that “our conscious thoughts use signal-signs to steer the 
engines in our minds, controlling countless processes of which we’re 
never much aware of”; in Richard Dawkin’s reference to the body as a 
“survival machine”; in E. O. Wilson’s reference to his brain as a 
machine; in the current way of identifying a plant cell as possessing a 
“powerhouse,” “a recycling centre,” and “a production centre”; and in 
today’s widespread references to the brain as like a computer.  
As meta-cognitive explanatory frameworks guide thought and 
behaviour at a taken-for-granted level of consciousness, they exercise a 
profound influence on many aspects of culture—and thus on the 
embodied experiences of the individual. For example, the root metaphor 
of patriarchy established the analogs for understanding the identity and 
behaviour of women in ways that were highly restrictive. It exercised 
this control over centuries until recently when the word woman, in 
some sectors of society, became associated with a wide range of new 
analogs such as engineer, artist, doctor, politician, and so forth. We 
could take other mutually supportive root metaphors in the West and 
trace how they create areas of silence, limit the vocabulary to what is 
conceptually and morally coherent with the root metaphor, and thus 
control the discourse that frames how political problems are understood 
and the approach to resolving them. What is especially important about 
these Western consciousness-shaping root metaphors is that they gave 
conceptual direction and moral legitimacy to the industrial-individually 
centred-consumer-dependent lifestyle that has been a major contributor 
to global warming and to the economic exploitation of the environment.  
As fisheries disappear, droughts become more widespread, storms more 
violent, and sources of potable water increasingly scarce and 
contaminated, the embodied experiences that Lakoff and Johnson want 
to claim as the source of concepts and inferences are unlikely to lead to 
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an awareness that everyday life is being impacted by a symbolic 
ecology that is still being reinforced at every level of the educational 
process— and by the media, political pundits, and even by many 
environmentalists. Embodied experience alone will not provide the 
conceptual and linguistic capital necessary for recognizing the double 
bind thinking that limits our ability to renew the intergenerational 
patterns of self-sufficiency and mutual support that represent 
alternatives to the industrial-consumer lifestyle—a lifestyle that is 
moving us closer to the tipping point and that will have huge 
consequences for the embodied experience of the individual—such as 
social chaos, starvation, and toxic chemical-caused illnesses and death. 
What is ironic, especially since the new root metaphor of evolution is 
now being used to explain how cultural patterns (memes) are subject to 
the same process of natural selection, is that it is being promoted by 
professors who are unaware that when evolution is turned into a root 
metaphor that supposedly explains the symbolic world of culture it 
supports the liberal market ideology that, in being globalized, is 
exacerbating the ecological crises. 
While Lakoff and Johnson claim that “our conceptual system is 
grounded in, neurally makes use of, and is crucially shaped by our 
perceptual and motor systems,” it turns out that their writings and ways 
of understanding political issues have been heavily influenced by the 
root metaphors they take for granted—and of which they are not 
explicitly aware. For example, Johnson responded in a letter to my 
earlier criticism of Lakoff’s lack of historical accuracy and misuse of 
our political categories by claiming that there is nothing problematic 
with Lakoff’s reference to environmentalists as progressives. The point 
to keep in focus is that Johnson’s association of environmentalism with 
the forces of progress and Lakoff’s reliance on the same political 
language that underlies the cultural forces that are pushing the world 
beyond what the ecosystems can sustain is that their concepts are not 
derived from their own embodied experiences. If they had done an 
ethnographic description of their own embodied experience (or what 
Clifford Geertz calls “thick description”) they would have found that 
their use of the context-free vocabulary of freedom, individual 
autonomy, and linear progress are derived not from their own 
experience but from the reification of analogs derived from 
Enlightenment thinkers that are reproduced in the languaging and 
socialization processes. A self-focused ethnography would lead to a 
different vocabulary, one that takes account of how the description of 
embodied experiences foregrounds the many biological and cultural 
conserving processes. This includes the language and thought patterns 
derived from the past, the temperamentally conserving of what one is 
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comfortable with in food, conversations, friends, of how their own 
DNA and RNA conserves physical traits that are intergenerationally 
connected, and all the taken-for-granted cultural patterns that sustain 
everyday life. In effect, a description of embodied experience that is not 
distorted by ideology and the formulaic use of language would be a 
description of conserving biological and cultural processes and 
patterns—with only minor ethno-biographic differences.  
Lakoff, in particular, is unable to rely on his own theory when it comes 
to justifying his political preferences, and to stigmatizing his political 
opponents. In his New York Times best-selling book, Don’t Think of an 
Elephant: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate (2004) Lakoff 
makes an important contribution to understanding how the use of 
language frames what is given attention and what is marginalized in 
today’s political discourse. He makes the point that language is not 
politically neutral. Instead, the group that is able to establish its 
preferred vocabulary (including its silences and metaphorically based 
prejudices) will control the policies that are conceptually consistent 
with its language. In effect, a group cannot achieve its own political 
goals if it is forced to think in the opponent’s language.  
Instead of following what is derived from his own embodied-based 
reasoning, Lakoff adopts the Orwellian vocabulary that is now current 
at every level of American political discourse. This discourse labels as 
conservatives the market liberals who derive their ideas about free 
markets and the invisible hand from the abstract theories of classical 
liberal thinkers—and the religious fundamentalists who derive their 
guiding principles from the equally abstract idea that the Bible, which 
has undergone many translations, represents the actual word of God. 
Lakoff’s historically uninformed thinking leads to identifying as 
progressive the social groups concerned with conserving our civil 
liberties (the American Civil Liberties Union), the environmentalists 
working to conserve species and habitats, the people who translate their 
religious traditions into social justice activism, and ethnic groups 
working to sustain the connections between their identities and their 
traditions.10
Lakoff also labels as conservatives the CATO Institute, the American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, and the Hoover 
Institute. If he had checked out their websites, rather than relying on 
popular misconceptions, he would have found that all three identify the 
expansion of free markets, individual freedom, and a strong defence as 
their primary political agenda. He would have found the following on 
the website of the CATO Institute: “‘Conservative’ smacks of an 
unwillingness to change, of a desire to preserve the status quo. Only in 
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America do people seem to refer to free-market capitalism—the most 
progressive, dynamic, and ever-changing system the world has ever 
known—as conservative.”11 Lakoff is old enough to remember Ronald 
Reagan introducing the General Electric weekly television program 
where the GE mantra, “Progress is our most important product” served 
as the analog the public was to identify with GE technologies. Surely, 
he is aware that the techno-scientific industrial culture has always 
claimed the role of being the primary progressive force in society. It has 
only been in recent years that, out of widespread ignorance that can be 
partly attributable to the failure of universities to introduce students to 
the historical roots of current ideologies, that the ever-changing system 
of free-market capitalism has been labelled as conservative.12
As pointed out, one of the characteristics of a root metaphor is that its 
supporting vocabulary does not include the words that enable the basic 
taken-for-granted cultural assumptions upon which it rests to be 
questioned. In the case of the root metaphor of progress, the two words 
that are either proscribed or mis-represented are tradition and 
conserving. By relying upon the root metaphor of progress to frame his 
analysis of liberalism and conservatism, Lakoff falls into the conceptual 
trap of letting the root metaphor of progress dictate what should not be 
questioned: namely, whether interpreting all forms of change as the 
expression of progress is partly responsible for undermining the 
traditions that should be conserved such as habeas corpus, the United 
States Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. Since the early days of the 
1900s, there has been a movement to conserve the environmental 
commons, which includes what remains of the natural systems that have 
not been taken over by private and corporate ownership and turned into 
market opportunities (which is considered by market liberals as 
progress). The cultural commons, which both Lakoff and Johnson could 
have made the focus of their discussion of embodied knowledge, 
includes the intergenerational knowledge, skills, and mutually 
supportive relationships that enable people to live more community-
centred and thus less money dependent and less environmentally 
destructive lives. Yet it is these communities that are sources of 
resistance to the market system that the CATO Institute celebrates as 
the engine of progress. In short, by uncritically accepting an 
interpretative framework (root metaphor) that can be traced back to the 
seventeenth-century shift in Western consciousness, Lakoff abandons 
his own prescriptions for how to account for “Embodied Reason.” In 
lacking an historical knowledge of the origins of philosophical 
conservatism, which led to our checks and balance system of 
government, and of the abstract theories of classical liberalism, Lakoff 
unknowingly aligns himself with the environmentally destructive and 
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cultural colonizing forces of the market liberals who promote progress 
as though it is a law of nature. 
The questions that should be asked about the Lakoff and Johnson theory 
of the embodied reason and the embodied origins of metaphorical 
thinking go far beyond their inability to abide by their own guiding 
assumptions. The deeper problem is their lack of awareness that we are 
not only at a tipping point in terms of the rate of environmental 
changes, but also at a tipping point as to whether humankind can move 
beyond the myths that underlie the individualistic/consumer-
oriented/industrial culture. The tipping point, in effect, involves the 
choice of following the current cultural agenda of economic 
globalization that is being adopted in many regions of the world or 
revitalizing the local cultural and environmental commons that 
represent a post-industrial consciousness based on the ancient root 
metaphor that defines the biological and cultural renewing processes as 
an ecology. Fortunately, many environmentally oriented scientists have 
moved beyond the mechanistic root metaphor by learning to think of 
the natural world as living ecologies, and many Third World cultures 
have not entirely lost their ecologically informed traditions.  
The main challenge will be for philosophers and social theorists, such 
as Lakoff and Johnson, to explain the dangers of accepting without 
question the root metaphors that were constituted before there was an 
awareness of ecological limits and to explain, in ways that can be 
widely understood, how our everyday vocabulary in the West needs to 
be framed by analogs that are culturally and ecologically informed. 
Given their unquestioning embrace of the root metaphor of progress 
and their commitment to assuming that embodied experience is the 
primary source of the metaphors that guide thought and behaviours, it is 
doubtful that their contribution will be little more than yet another 
distraction as we move closer to the ecological tipping point. Perhaps if 
they were to start not with the embodied experience of the supposedly 
autonomous individual, but with the individual’s culturally mediated 
embodied experience, they would have the conceptual opening for 
considering the influence of culture, the role of language in the cultural 
construction of identities and ways of thinking, the impact of diverse 
cultures on embodied experiences, and the ecological implications of 
doing a “thick description” or personal ethnography of the 
interdependencies within the local cultural commons. This would have 
represented a genuine departure from the silences and hubris of most 
Western philosophers.  
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